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The question of how antitrust policy “ought” to treat vertical distri­
bution restraints in the 1980s under section 1 of the Sherman Act1 em­
bodies the difficulties entailed when any field of law becomes captive to a 
single paradigm.2 Inherently political assumptions concerning the 
proper scope of property and contract rights and government power to 
regulate the economy, and unrealistic factual assumptions concerning the 
nature of vertical economic relationships have come to the fore in cur­
rently fashionable analysis of vertical restraints.3 Furthermore, executive
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1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination . . .  or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade”).
2 See, e.g., F. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of 
Legal Criticism 3-7 (1959). In describing the analytical positivism of the late nineteenth cen­
tury, Roscoe Pound described a state of affairs analogous to current undue reliance on neoclas­
sical economic theory to decide antitrust cases.
In a developed legal system when a judge decides a cause he seeks, first, to attain 
justice in that particular cause, and second, to attain it in accordance with law—that is, 
on grounds and by a process prescribed in or provided by law. One must admit that the 
strict theory of the last century denied the first proposition, conceiving the judicial func­
tion to begin and end in applying to an ascertained set of facts a rigidly defined legal 
formula definitively prescribed as such or exactly deduced from authoritatively pre­
scribed premises.
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt. 3), 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 940 (1923).
3 See, e.g., R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 289 (1978) (“When a manufacturer wishes to 
impose resale price maintenance or vertical division of reseller markets, or any other restraint 
upon the rivalry of resellers, his motive cannot be the restriction of output and, therefore, can 
only be the creation of distributive efficiency.”); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1984) (“No manufacturer wants to have less competition among its dealers 
for the sake of less competition. The reduction in dealers’ rivalry in the price dimension is just 
the tool the manufacturer uses to induce greater competition in the service dimension.”); Pos­
ner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 11 (1981) (“[T]he manufacturer’s objective in restricting competition among
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and certain judicial applications of the Sherman Act to restrictive com­
mercial agreements have increasingly been characterized by use of 
cliches4 and deductive reasoning instead of reflective inductive analysis. 
When this occurs, the governing rules are detached from the legislative 
rationales that gave them birth.
Proper application of rules intended to govern commercial relation­
ships must first identify the values that the relevant statute is meant to 
maintain. Traditional legal analysis addresses how, within the limita­
tions of the judicial process, those values can be implemented in the con­
text of disputes touching upon them. Antitrust jurisprudence of vertical 
distribution restraints has seldom addressed these deeper political and 
jurisprudential dimensions.5
Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards ap­
plied in antitrust analysis, particularly in the analysis of vertical re­
straints, this Article first considers the underlying jurisprudential nature 
of legal reasoning as background for determining what the law of vertical 
restraints ought to be. The Article then explores the implications of sub­
stituting “economic analysis”—in the narrow sense of the economic anal­
ysis advocated by the Chicago School of “law and economics”6—for
its dealers or distributors is to induce them to provide greater services to the customer.”).
Each of these assertions of the nature of vertical market restraints is unsupported by 
empirical evidence. Each is, rather, the product of deductive reasoning from the abstract and 
unrealistic normative and factual assumptions underlying the neoclassical model and, there­
fore, asserts merely that the sole goal of antitrust policy is to maximize the contract and prop­
erty rights of the proponent of a restraint taking place in a perfectly competitive market. See 
Ponsoldt, The Unreasonableness of Coerced Cooperation: A Comment Upon the NCAA Deci­
sion’s Rejection of the Chicago School, 31 Antitrust Bull. 1003 (1986).
4 One of the more popular cliches is that the antitrust laws protect competition, not com­
petitors. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). The cliche implicitly 
asserts that one can have competition without competitors, contains no definition of “competi­
tion,” and is frequently used to deny the congressionally defined goals of antitrust policy in 
favor of the narrow goals assumed by the neoclassical model. See Flynn, The “Is” and 
“Ought” of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1095, 1144 n.234 (1986).
5 See Baker & Blumenthal, Ideological Cycles and Unstable Antitrust Rules, 31 Antitrust 
Bull. 323, 323-24 (1986) (discussing ebb and flow of populist sentiment toward antitrust law). 
Presently pending before the Supreme Court is a case that may allow the Court to reflect more 
deeply upon the political and jurisprudential dimensions of vertical restraints. In Business 
Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, granted, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987) (No. 
85-1910), the Court may determine whether an agreement between a manufacturer and its 
retailers to prevent price discounting without any understanding regarding specific resale 
prices should be condemned under the per se rule. The Fifth Circuit held that the per se rule 
of illegality does not apply unless there is an agreement regarding a specific resale price.
6 See Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979) 
(describing evolution of “Chicago School” approach to antitrust analysis). It should be noted 
that underlying policy goals may also dictate which facts are relevant, what they mean, and 
how they apply in the circumstances. One of the authors of this Article has noted that Chi­
cago School adherents urge that “antitrust laws should be applied only in a manner that in­
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legal reasoning in disputes arising under the antitrust laws. A more ac­
curate, multivalued background for antitrust policy is explored.7 This 
Article finally proposes a method for analysis of vertical restraints that 
will allow antitrust law to implement the goals Congress has mandated, 
yet address constructively the commercial practices it must regulate.
I
L e g a l  R e a s o n in g  a n d  t h e  C u r r e n t  St a t e  o f  
A n t i t r u s t  A n a l y s i s
A. Background to Antitrust Reasoning
Legal reasoning is variously described as reasoning by analogy, as 
not logic but experience, as a process of drawing inferences from prem­
ises, or, more generally, as an inductive and deductive process in which 
concepts are used to link facts and rules in light of the legislative goals of 
the law.8 It is the experience of the common law process that the just, 
peaceful, and rational resolution of disputes must recognize community 
standards as expressed through the rules we call law and must account 
for the realities of the particular dispute presented for resolution. It is in
creases economic efficiency. But, utilizing a creatively deceptive transformation, [they have] 
defined ‘efficiency’ in neoclassical economic terms to mean the maximization of aggregate so­
cial wealth without regard for the distribution of that wealth or its political consequences.” 
Ponsoldt, On the Docket: Robert Bork, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1987, at 27 (letter); see also 
Ponsoldt, The Ideological Shaping of the Federal Judiciary, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,1984, at A22; 
Ponsoldt, Judges’ Ideology Must Be Checked, Balanced, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 12 
(letter).
7 This process involves a series of “ought” propositions. Even when general consensus in 
support of the specific rules of a regime of law and the goals it is designed to achieve may 
obscure the normative nature of the analysis, the analysis is nonetheless the normative one of 
determining the relevance, meaning, and applicability of facts and rules in light of the moral 
goals underlying the law.
An ethics, like a metaphysics, is no more certain and no less dangerous because it is 
unconsciously held. There are few judges, psychologists, or economists today who do 
not begin a consideration of their typical problems with some formula designed to cause 
all moral ideals to disappear and to produce an issue purified for the procedure of posi­
tive empirical science. But the ideals have generally retired to hats from which later 
wonders will magically arise.
F. Cohen, supra note 2, at 3; see also Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in 
Moral and Legal History, 9 J. Legal Stud. 335, 336-39 (1980) (describing law as moral 
science).
8 See B. Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process (1921); F. Cohen, supra note 2; R. 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986); O. Holmes, The Common Law (1881); E. Levi, An Introduc­
tion to Legal Reasoning (1949); R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922). 
For a review of current disputes over the nature of legal reasoning, see Stick, Can Nihilism be 
Pragmatic?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332, 336-38 (1986) (discussing influences of legal theorists on 
“nihilist” branch of critical legal studies theorists); Wellman, Practial Reasoning and Judicial 
Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 45, 63-87 (1985) (comparing 
deductive and analogical theories of legal reasoning).
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the interaction of law and fact that legal analysis plays its central and 
unique role of adjusting reality to society’s values, and of adjusting soci­
ety’s values to reality.
Implementation of antitrust policy over the years has exhibited 
many attributes of the rigid form of legal reasoning roughly character­
ized as analytical positivism. Reliance on fixed definitions and rules has 
replaced inductive legal reasoning with rigid deductive reasoning. The 
rules themselves usually have been premised on narrow and questionable 
factual and normative assumptions about society and its economic insti­
tutions. Furthermore, this rigid reasoning process has precluded, 
through its definitional strategies, both alternative normative statements 
relevant to the dispute and alternative ways of understanding the facts.
In the early history of the Sherman Act, courts lost sight of the law’s 
underlying policies when they applied literally the language barring 
“every” contract or conspiracy “in restraint of trade.”9 After adjusting 
interpretations to social and economic reality, as well as to Congress’s 
original goals,10 the pendulum swung to an amorphous “rule of reason,” 
permitting judges to invoke their own unstated values in applying the 
antitrust laws.11 The pendulum then swung back to rigid application of
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9 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
If such an agreement restrain trade or commerce, it is prohibited by the statute, unless it 
can be said that an agreement, no matter what its terms, relating only to transportation 
cannot restrain trade or commerce. We see no escape from the conclusion that if any 
agreement of such a nature does restrain it, the agreement is condemned by this act. 
Id. at 312.
10 This adjustment began with United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282­
83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), in which the court read into § 1 of the Act that 
the statute banned only “unreasonable” restraints of trade. This interpretation was eventually 
adopted by the Supreme Court. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 
180 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911).
11 Although the rule of reason was launched by Standard Oil Co., see 221 U.S. at 60, that 
decision and its methodology were not unduly vague. The Court announced a balancing-pro­
cess methodology and identified factors indicating the reasonableness of a restraint. Some 
ambiguity is unavoidable in such a process, but the process nonetheless is directed by sensitiv­
ity to the underlying values of the law invoked. However, later cases reflected a gradual drift 
from implementing congressional goals to implementing the general policy of laissez faire that 
characterized the period. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 
(1925) (permitting sharing of industry cost and inventory data among manufacturers); Cement 
Mfrs. Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (same); United States v. General 
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (permitting, as true agency, arrangement in which manufac­
turer denoted 26,000 retailers as its agents and sold to agents under scheme of preset retail 
prices). When coupled with the Great Depression, this judicial abandonment of congressional 
values in favor of undefined judicial values led to the general desuetude of antitrust until the 
end of the 1930s. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) 
(finding that combination of coal producers to eliminate competition among themselves did 
not violate Sherman Act because competition in total marketplace not injuriously affected).
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per se rules and defined categories of illegality.12
Today we are witnessing a similar swing of the pendulum within the 
executive and judicial branches, this time to the extreme of finding con­
duct per se lawful without regard for the values embodied in the antitrust 
laws or for the facts of particular disputes. Decisions regarding the valid­
ity of vertical restraints now apply neoclassical economic theory and lib­
ertarian politics to the exclusion of all other values and, moreover, apply 
an axiomatic methodology designed to give effect to that theory.13
This mechanical, deductive reasoning is well demonstrated by the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of vertical distribution cases under section 1 
of the Sherman Act. The Court has implied effective support for per se 
legality in all cases save vertical price fixing in order to avoid a rigid rule 
of per se illegality.14 For example, in rejecting the per se illegality rule of 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,15 the Court in Continental T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.16 placed great weight on the assumed rational­
ity of suppliers operating in perfectly competitive markets.
The Schwinn test precluded inquiry into the reasons for the re­
straint, and similarly precluded evaluation of the effects of the restraint 
upon suppliers and consumers. The Continental T. V. test, on the other 
hand, instead favors unrealistic assumptions of fact and value about the 
reason for the restraint and its effect in an idealized market of perfect 
competition.17
12 This shift was launched by United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 
(1940); see also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (finding that 
vertical restraints violated Sherman Act when they restrained alienation after title passed), 
overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Fortner Enters, 
v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (holding that arrangement tying 
distribution of one product or service to another constituted violation of Sherman Act when 
such tying foreclosed competition from any substantial market).
13 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (group of 
manufacurers cannot be accused of predatory pricing when it has no rational possibility of 
recoupment); see also Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 Hastings L.J. 517 (1987); Ponsoldt, 
Reagan Circuit Judges Assault the Rule of Law, Nat’l L.J., Feb. 7, 1983 at 12 (letter), quoted 
in Shafer v. Burk Petroleum Corp., 569 F. Supp. 621, 625 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
14 The Court has also mitigated per se illegality by manipulating the definition of the “con­
tract, combination or conspiracy” element of the offense. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Inde­
pendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-74 (1984).
15 388 U.S. 365, 374-82 (1967).
•6 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
17 This approach is sought by proponents of a “law and economics” approach to analysis 
of vertical restraints.
Finally, we argued that substantially all distributional restraints have the same conse­
quence, namely the attenuation of intrabrand pricing rivalry and the intensification of 
interbrand rivalry through nonprice means. Accordingly, the fact that a given restraint 
has among its consequences an upward affect [sic] on price is totally irrelevant to the 
question whether it should be characterized as a resale price maintenance type restraint. 
Baxter, A Review of Antitrust Division Briefs, 15 J. Reprints for Antitrust L. & Econ. i, xviii
(1985). For a general assessment of the Chicago School’s neglect of the values of antitrust law,
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This shift from one rigid and mechanical test to another precludes in 
both instances a full inquiry, in light of the values Congress mandated 
and of the facts of individual cases, into whether vertical price and non­
price restraints ought to be permitted or prohibited in all cases, or in 
some cases but not in others.
B. The Positivism o f Neoclassical Economics in Antitrust: A Critique
Current implementation of the antitrust laws, both by enforcement 
agencies and in many judicial decisions, exemplifies a breakdown in the 
common law analytical process. Judicial and executive reluctance to re­
alistically evaluate vertical distribution restraints in light of governing 
legislation represents the subservience of law to ideology. Captured by a 
superficial methodology and by an erroneous moral premise claiming to 
be scientifically based,18 antitrust analysis is becoming a sterile and irrele­
vant exercise in confirming inappropriate political goals or nonexistent 
facts—or both—by applying predetermined rules to predetermined facts 
to reach predetermined conclusions.
The rigid deductive reasoning of one brand of neoclassical economic 
theory has displaced the complex inductive and deductive reasoning
see Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justification for Vertical Restraints: A Response 
to Chicago’s Swiftian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1166 (1987).
18 No small part of the attraction of economic theory is the assertion by some that econom­
ics is a science capable of producing “truth” like the supposed truths in physics, chemistry, or 
astronomy. Paradoxically, just as science was coming to realize that its models did not neces­
sarily produce eternal and unchanging truths, and indeed were incapable of doing so, econom­
ics was becoming captive to an outmoded concept of the nature of scientific knowledge. For 
descriptions of the evolution in scientific reasoning see J. Conant, Modem Science and Modem 
Man (1953); T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970); A. Whitehead, 
The Function of Reason (1958); A. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (1938). For a critical anal­
ysis of the claim that economics is a science, see Rosenberg, If Economics Isn’t Science, What 
Is It?, 14 Phil. F. 296, 311 (1983) (“[W]e should view [economics] as a branch of mathematics, 
one devoted to examining the formal properties of a set of assumptions about the transitivity of 
abstract relations: axioms that implicitly define a technical notion of ‘rationality,’ just as geom­
etry examines the formal properties of abstract points and lines.”).
Although many lawyers superficially familiar with economics, as well as some economists, 
appear to be captured by the neoclassical model, there is growing recognition that the disci­
pline is in intellectual difficulty, if not disrepute, because of its divorce from the reality it claims 
to describe. See T. Balough, The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics, in Further Essays on 
Economic Theory 176 (1978); Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litiga­
tion, 12 Sw. U.L. Rev. 335 (1980-1981); Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: 
The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1309 (1986); A. Kamarck, Economics 
and the Real World (1983); I. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973); Kuttner, 
The Poverty of Economics, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1985, at 74; Leontief, Why Economics 
Needs Input-Output Analysis (Interview), Challenge, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 27; Ponsoldt, Anti­
trust Reform Isn’t the Answer, Nat’l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 13 (letter); Rowe, The Decline of 
Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. 
L.J. 1511 (1984); Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317 (1977).
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process of proper legal analysis of antitrust disputes. Not only are the 
normative assumptions underlying neoclassical theory19 substituted for 
those Congress intended the antitrust laws to fulfill, but the facts as­
sumed by the model are substituted for the facts of actual disputes.20 
The result is a process at war with the appropriate use of, and institu­
tional constraints upon, legal reasoning: a process that ignores both the 
reality it must address and the values that Congress mandated that anti­
trust policy preserve.21
Closer attention to the concepts and premises of the architects of the 
neoclassical evolution in antitrust law reveals the hollowness of that the­
ory. Judge Bork, for example, has claimed that the legislative history of 
the major antitrust statutes reveals that Congress had one goal in mind
19 The claim is often made that the neoclassical model is morally neutral and can be ap­
plied mechanically without invoking the decision maker’s own moral values. However, by its 
assumptions the model chooses which facts and which values ought to be deemed relevant to 
analysis. This inescapable attribute of legal and other forms of reasoning was the central issue 
in a recent debate between Judge Easterbrook and Professor Tribe. Compare Easterbrook, 
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4 (1984) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices today are more sophisticed in economic 
reasoning and apply it more thoroughly than at any other time in history) with Tribe, Consti­
tutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (1985) (calling 
Supreme Court’s increasingly utilitarian approach to legal problems insufficiently attentive to 
distibution of wealth and power and to underlying social values and perspectives essential to 
constitutional decisions); see also Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1985) (arguing that judges must address scarcity and, hence, economics, in 
shaping values of concern to Professor Tribe).
20 The neoclassical model is static, comparing the abstract extreme of a hypothetical purely 
competitive market with the abstract extreme of a hypothetical purely monopolized one. For a 
criticism of these assumptions, see Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 213, 256-83 (1985) (arguing that neoclassical market efficiency model is not useful in 
identifying anticompetitive behavior because model is static, dwells too much on long-run ef­
fects, and fails to appreciate social costs of monopolistic behavior).
21 For example, the Supreme Court essentially ignored the facts of an antitrust dispute, the 
goals of antitrust policy, the separate functions of judge and jury, and the role of summary 
judgment in Matsushita Elec. Indus, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Facts unique to individual industries are often ignored by advocates of the neoclassical 
model in their determination of whether to follow the dictates of the model in fashioning 
antitrust rules. Compare Posner, supra note 3, at 23 (advocating per se legality for vertical 
restrictions on intrabrand competition among distributors or dealers) with Gerla, Discounters 
and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. Corp. L. 1, 21-24 (1986) 
(arguing that adverse effect of some vertical restraints, and competition that some discounters 
provide, should rule out possibility of treating all vertical restraints as per se legal) and Car- 
stensen & Dahlson, Vertical Restraints in Beer Distribution: A Study of the Business Justifica­
tions for and Legal Analysis of Restricting Competition, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 80 (arguing that 
other interests, including public’s, should be considered in assessing legality of vertical re­
straints). See generally Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of 
Competition, 37 Va. L. Rev. 1083,1094 (1951) (arguing that because legal theories of competi­
tion and restraint of trade are far in advance of their economic counterparts, courts must avoid 
ritualistic antitrust enforcement and must strike balance between enough market control to 
provide incentives to small businesses and creation of a “cartelized ossified system even when 
that system has the effect of protecting a horde of ‘little’ businesses”).
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when it adopted each of the major antitrust laws—that the antitrust laws 
be used to promote consumer welfare by maximizing “efficiency.”22 
Judge Posner, in turn, defines efficiency as “exploiting economic re­
sources in such a way that ‘value’—human satisfaction as measured by 
aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services—is 
maximized.”23
The neoclassical concept of efficiency—which is at the heart of the 
libertarian political model—is further modified by a series of assumptions 
about an unreal world of perfect competition.24 The neoclassical effi­
ciency talisman, moreover, is measured by tautological definitions of ra­
tional individuals and collective conduct.25 The model is based on a 
seemingly innocuous premise, but the premise is not empirically or politi­
cally verified and is asserted without reference to other disciplines that 
have studied human behavior.26 That premise is that individuals are ra­
tional maximizers of their ends in life and that an observer can tell what 
people want and how much they want by noting how much they are 
willing to pay for it. Thus, the argument goes, the antitrust laws should 
not inhibit rational—that is, efficient—business behavior that is profit en­
hancing for buyer and seller. This argument, however, is merely an apol­
ogy for enforcing the paternalism of the proponent of a restraint.27
22 See R. Bork, supra note 3, at 61-66.
23 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 4 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
24 The late Joan Robinson commented on the significance of the steps taken in building 
neoclassical theory.
It is not legitimate to say: Let us first assume perfect competition, and bring in the 
complications later; for an economy in which textbook perfect competition was possible 
would be different from our own in important respects; we do not know what contradic­
tions we may be letting ourselves in for by assuming it. Indeed, it usually has to be 
buttressed by a range of further assumptions, such as: that plant is perfectly durable, 
there is no interest on working capital, and so forth. Very drastic assumptions are useful 
to hack out a new path, but it hardly seems worthwhile making them in order to stroll 
up a well-trodden blind alley.
4 J. Robinson, Collected Economic Papers 132 (1980).
25 See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1014, 
1018-19 (1928) (“No natural or social science has found its secrets in words and phrases and 
neither will the science of law.”).
26 In his review of Judge Posner’s Economic Analysis o f  Law, Arthur Leff asked, “Can one 
actually, now, write four hundred pages about human desire without adverting to Freud, his 
followers, or even his enemies?” Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nomi­
nalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 474 (1974). Professor Leff made similar observations about the 
disciplines of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and law, finding them virtually ignored in 
establishing the first premises in neoclassical thought of the type Judges Bork, Easterbrook, 
and Posner advocate.
27 For an exhaustive examination of the assumption of rationality in several disciplines and 
empirical studies, see Harrison, supra note 18. Professor Harrison concludes his analysis of 
the rationality assumption underlying the law and economics movement with the observation: 
“It has become a particularly virulent form of crabgrass that too many measure by the ground 
it covers rather than by any genuine nurturing it provides. Before we abandon the legal field to
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Law and economics advocates further claim that economists have 
no concern for the wisdom or morality of the choices made by business­
men and consumers, that theirs is but an accounting function of toting 
up those choices. When businessmen agree on or are coerced into a dis­
tribution method that appears, on balance, rational because it maximizes 
profits,28 the antitrust laws should not interfere. However, advocates of 
neoclassical theory fail to explain why the discipline of economics ought 
to adopt such a politically loaded definition of “rational.” That the 
choices people make should be measured only by what they are willing to 
pay is a claim that would probably surprise many scholars.29 Perhaps 
the neoclassicists’ objective is to portray this method of analysis as a 
closed system like geometry, capable of always producing truth and be­
yond normative criticism.30
The weakness of the premises of rationality and efficiency ultimately 
lies in their underinclusiveness. First, the premises exclude from consid­
eration everything that cannot be quantified materialistically by people’s 
willingness to pay.31 Second, the premises exclude from consideration
economics, we had better measure more carefully the fertile thought of other disciplines.” Id. 
at 1363.
The assumption of rationality is transferred to “institutions Adam Smith never dreamed 
of” so that corporations and other complex collectives in modem life are assumed to be acting 
rationally at all times or “as if” they were acting rationally. Errors in judgment as to how to 
maximize are presumably disciplined by the assumed existence of other rational maximizers 
operating in an assumed perfectly competitive market. Flynn, supra note 18, at 348-49.
28 Commenting upon Judge Posner’s unquestioning use of the neoclassical concept of “ra­
tional,” Arthur Leff observed:
Thus what people do is good, and its goodness can be determined by looking at 
what it is they do. In place of the more arbitrary normative “goods” of Formalism, and 
in place of the complicated empirical “goods” of Realism, stands the simple definition­
ally circular “value” of Posner’s book. If human desire itself becomes normative (in the 
sense that it cannot be criticized), and if human desire is made definitionally identical 
with certain human acts, then those human acts are also beyond criticism in normative 
or efficiency terms; everyone is doing as best he can exactly what he set out to do which, 
by definition, is “good” for him. In those terms, it is not at all surprising that economic 
analyses have a considerable power in predicting how people in fact behave.
Leff, supra note 26, at 458 (emphasis in original). This reasoning is the basis for the claim that 
neoclassical economic analysis is value free and does not include any subjective criticism of the 
choices made. It is also the basis of the claim that the model is scientific in the sense of being 
neutral and objective. Once the basic definitions are in place, the tautology makes criticism 
impossible.
29 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 18, at 1357-58 (questioning reliance on expression of 
value as indicator of preference); Leff, supra note 26, at 481 (“We all know that all value is not 
a sole function of willingness to pay . . . .”).
30 See Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Com­
modities, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 939, 958-67 (1985).
31 See Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769 (criticizing neoclassical ap­
proach to choice for its failure to consider unquantifiable factors such as regret and duress); see 
also Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. Legal Stud. 
243, 243 (1980) (recognizing criticism of neoclassical theory for its exclusion of claims based
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the inaction of those who are unable to express their choices because they 
lack things of value to exchange for the choices they wish to make.32 
Moreover, the theorists make an implicit normative assumption when 
they use willingness to pay as a measurement of rationality and effi­
ciency, rather than drawing on the multiplicity of explanations for 
human behavior available from other disciplines.33 This normative as­
sumption creates a political bias that disfavors democratic intervention to 
protect the least wealthy and powerful.34
The political bias of neoclassical economics justifies relabeling as 
“pseudo-rational” the economic concept of rational. A major factor in­
fluencing any calculus of choice is the existing legal system governing the 
society in which the individual makes the choices being measured.35 If a 
legal model is created to protect or further “rational behavior,” the ensu­
ing behavior necessarily will incorporate the commands and protections 
of the legal model. Thus, the concept of “rational” is self-fulfilling and 
utterly artificial.
Thus, for example, it may appear rational to commit certain crimes 
in a society that defines rational behavior artificially and does not impose 
any punishment for the crimes. When deductive logic is then used to 
avoid questioning normative assumptions, it is not difficult to understand 
how advocates of the neoclassical model can conclude that society ought 
to permit the selling of babies,36 ought to permit individuals to sell them­
selves into slavery,37 and ought to be concerned only with enforcing the 
property rights of suppliers in assessing the legality of vertical market 
restraints.
on “pure desire”).
32 Leff, supra note 26, at 478-79; see also Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 
191, 191-92 (1980) (challenging neoclassicist definition of “wealth maximization”); Kronman, 
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227, 228-29 (1980) (same).
33 The meaning and implications of rationality have been issues in philosophy since the 
stoics and are currently the subject of extensive study in a number of disciplines. See, e.g., 
Harrison, supra note 18, at 1339 (recognizing contributions of philosophy, psychology, biol­
ogy, and anthropology to explanation of altruism as motivating factor in individual choice).
34 See Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 939, 940 
(1980); Kronman, supra note 32, at 242.
35 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought: A Progressive Critique, in The 
Politics of Law 18, 37 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); see also Samuels, Normative Premises in Regula­
tory Theory, 1 J. Post-Keynesian Econ. 100, 106 (1978) (“With no unique optimal use of 
resources and opportunities independent of rights identification and assignment, the legal sys­
tem must select the result to be pursued: the definition o f  the efficient solution is both the object 
and the subject o f  the legal system.” (emphasis in original)).
36 See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 5.4 (3d ed. 1986); Landes & Posner, The 
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978).
37 See R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 86 (1981); R. Posner & A. Kronman, The 
Economics of Contract Law 256-60 (1979).
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The neoclassical definition of efficiency38 is derived from this circu­
lar definition of rationality. It is a definition premised on the unstated 
assumptions underlying its definition of rationality.
The neoclassicists subdivide efficiency into the concepts of allocative 
efficiency and productive efficiency. Judge Bork has defined these con­
cepts as follows: “Allocative efficiency . . . refers to the placement of 
resources in the economy, the question of whether resources are em­
ployed in tasks where consumers value their output most. Productive 
efficiency refers to the effective use of resources by particular firms.”39 
Judge Bork then asserts, “The whole task of antitrust can be summed up 
as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive 
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare.”40
This analysis is superficially attractive because it appeals to human 
freedom 41 The analysis is also seductive because it uses language with 
laudable popular meanings, such as “rational,” “efficiency,” and “con­
sumer welfare,” to describe normatively loaded concepts that can be un­
derstood only in light of the tautological definitions and hidden 
assumptions underlying the model.
Furthermore, the analysis taps into a presently popular fear of dis­
cretion, particularly discretion exercised by governmental decision mak­
ers. The analytical positivists attempt to allay these fears by claiming 
that the neoclassical model ends the risk of the irrationality of discre­
tion 42 The positivists consider discretion irrational, rather than ines­
capable, because it does not provide a “scientific” method of control over 
the arbitrary exercise of judicial power to regulate capital or complement 
a “rule of law.” However, the American political experiment has long 
been recognized as a compromise between the forces of economic liberty 
and laissez-faire capitalism on the one hand, and democratic regulation 
of capital on the other. “For the majority to support capitalism, it must 
have faith in the fairness and integrity of the market; the market must be 
sufficiently regulated for wealth distribution not to be too disproportion­
ate; and the middle class must remain active and independent.”43
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38 For an examination of some of the complexities of the general concept of efficiency, see 
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980).
39 R. Bork, supra note 3, at 91.
«  Id.
41 See Leff, supra note 26, at 477 (recognizing that value of freedom “directs and informs” 
neoclassical approach).
42 See, e.g., R. Bork, supra note 3, at 117 (“There is no body of knowledge other than 
conventional price theory that can serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior upon the 
consumer welfare [as defined by the model]. To abandon economic theory is to abandon the 
possibility of a rational antitrust law.”).
43 Ponsoldt, Democracy and Capitalism Collide, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at A26 (letter).
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Any attempt to define the role of antitrust with respect to property 
and contract rights solely in terms of the neoclassical model would result 
in the abolition of the antitrust laws.44 This rebirth of rigid positivism45 
is as startling as it is intellectually indefensible 46 Moreover, it would 
result in the denial of the goals for antitrust mandated by Congress and 
result in the judicial repeal of the law. It is to the congressionally man­
dated goals of antitrust law and policy that we now turn.
II
T h e  G o a l s  o f  A n t i t r u s t  P o l ic y  a n d  T h e ir
JUSTIFICATION
There is a curious and growing belief that Congress intended the 
antitrust laws to serve only the goal of allocative efficiency as defined by 
the “law and economics” wing of neoclassical economic theory or, 
notwithstanding congressional intent, that the antitrust laws ought to be 
interpreted this way. The principal proponent of the view that Congress 
intended the antitrust laws to serve only the goal of allocative efficiency is 
Judge Bork.47 Judges Posner and Easterbrook are the principal propo­
nents of the view that the antitrust laws ought to be interpreted with 
allocative efficiency as the primary goal of antitrust policy, regardless of 
what Congress intended.48
44 See, e.g., Dewey, Antitrust and Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendship (Book Re­
view), 87 Yale L.J. 1516, 1518 (1978) (reviewing R. Bork, supra note 3).
45 See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 285
(1979) (describing his form of economic analysis of law as methodology for describing what 
“is” as opposed to a normative approach attempting to define what law “ought” to be). In 
legal analysis, however, the “is” cannot be divorced from the “ought.” See Burton, Comment 
on “Empty Ideas”: Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 Yale L.J. 1136, 1140 
(1982); Flynn, supra note 4, at 1126.
46 See Baker, supra note 34; Harrison, supra note 18; Kelman, Misunderstanding Social 
Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of “Law and Economics,” 33 J. Legal Educ. 274 (1983); 
Leff, supra note 26; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 
46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307 (1979); Miller, Economic Analysis of Legal Method and Law: The 
Danger In Valueless Values, 21 Gonz. L. Rev. 425 (1986).
47 See R. Bork, supra note 3, at 50-71 (1978) (discussing legislative intent of antitrust laws); 
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7 (1966) (same).
48 See Posner, supra note 3; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis 
of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Doctrines, 75 
Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975). Judge Easterbrook is perhaps the most extreme in applying a 
doctrinaire law and economics approach to antitrust analysis without regard for the legislative 
history of the statutes or the facts of individual cases. See Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust 
Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1702 (1986) (“[The Sherman Act] does not contain a program; 
it is instead a blank check.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1 (“[The] goal of antitrust 
is to perfect the operation of competitive markets.”). In the latter article, Judge Easterbrook 
dismissed the plaintiff’s predatory pricing in In re Japanese Prods. Antitrust Litig. 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574 (1986), solely on the basis of the assumptions and predictions of the law and economics
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The principal difficulty with Judge Bork’s position, and the reason 
that the growing presumption in favor of his position is curious, is that 
he is wrong in his reading of the legislative history. The principal diffi­
culty with the position Judges Posner and Easterbrook advocate is that 
their position is impossible to implement honestly in an adversarial sys­
tem that relies upon common law legal reasoning and deference to the 
policies mandated by the lawgiver—in this case, Congress.
A. The Historical Goals o f Antitrust Policy
Judge Bork’s analysis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws 
is a case of “believing is seeing” rather than “seeing is believing.” Neo­
classical price theory and its concept of efficiency were unknown when 
the major federal antitrust laws were adopted.49 Moreover, the leading 
economists of the day, largely of the classical school, either opposed or 
ignored the adoption of the antitrust laws.50 It is difficult to believe that 
the legislators, adopting a statute over the objections or ignorance of the 
professional economists of the day, meant nonetheless to implement the 
values and goals of that group.51
If Judge Bork is claiming that the Congresses that adopted the anti­
trust laws meant to pursue the values that neoclassical economic theory 
later suggested ought to be the goals of the antitrust laws, that claim is 
simply false. Scholars who have made detailed studies of the legislative 
history of the antitrust laws reject such a reading and find that the legis­
lative histories indicate that Congress had multiple goals in mind.52 The
model, without any reference to the record in the case. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 27. 
The Supreme Court followed Judge Easterbrook’s analysis in its Matsushita decision, analyz­
ing the predictions of the model in light of its assumptions rather than legislative goals for 
antitrust policy and the facts of the case.
49 See Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 487, 487 (1983); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern 
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 88 (1982).
50 Lande, supra note 49, at 88-89. None of the schools of economics had much influence 
on Congress in general and on the “trust question” in particular. H. Thorelli, The Federal 
Antitrust Policy 120-21 (1954); see also W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America 77 
(1965).
51 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 249 (1985) 
(“The legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything resembling a 
dominant concern for economic efficiency.”).
52 See, e.g., R. Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in The Paranoid 
Style in American Politics, and Other Essays 188 (1965).
The goals of antitrust were of three kinds. The first were economic; the classical model 
of competition confirmed the belief that the maximum of economic efficiency would be 
produced by competition, and at least some members of Congress must have been under 
the spell of this intellectually elegant model, insofar as they were able to formulate their 
economic intentions in abstract terms. The second class of goals was political; the anti­
trust principle was intended to block private accumulations of power and protect demo­
cratic government. The third was social and moral; the competitive process was
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most succinct and accurate summary of those goals is that suggested by 
Professor Eleanor Fox. “There are four major historical goals of anti­
trust, and all should continue to be respected. These are: (1) dispersion 
of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the mer­
its, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition 
process as market governor.”53 These are political goals, values, and 
“ought” propositions. They call for tools of analysis capable of imple­
menting a more subtle concept of competition, competition as a pro­
cess,54 rather than the mechanically measured quantitative concept 
advocated by neoclassical theorists. It is clear that Congress intended to 
regulate commerce and to prohibit private commercial practices that in­
terfered with the competitive process, regardless of the wealth-enhancing 
quality of those practices.
The question of the goals or values that Congress did intend the 
antitrust laws to fulfill remains a central and ambiguous issue in antitrust 
litigation. Although there is something to be said for maintaining a cer­
tain level of ambiguity in the interrelated values underlying a law in or­
der to maintain judicial flexibility in the face of factual complexity, there 
should be little debate over the necessity for judicial deference to legisla­
tive judgment in economic policy making. There should be no debate 
over the necessity of at least identifying the legislative policy goals of a 
field of law, if judicial enforcement of the policy is to be coherent and 
predictable.
The inconsistencies of present antitrust enforcement merely mani­
fest a deeper conflict over the goals of antitrust policy. Past attempts to 
make the sterile analytical systems of positivism work foundered because 
legal analysis became preoccupied with definitions divorced from reality,
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believed to be a kind of disciplinary machinery for the development of character, and the 
competitiveness of the people—the fundamental stimulus to national morale—was be­
lieved to need protection.
Id. at 199-200; see also H. Thorelli, supra note 50. The leading historical studies of the con­
gressional goals for antitrust policy are surveyed in Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A 
New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981).
53 Fox, supra note 52, at 1182.
54 Id. at 1154.
One overarching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust of power, concern 
for consumers, and commitment to opportunity for entrepreneurs): competition as proc­
ess. The competition process is the preferred governor of markets. If the impersonal 
forces of competition, rather than public or private power, determine market behavior 
and outcomes, power is by definition dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms 
without market power are increased, and the results are acceptable and fair. Some 
measure of productive and allocative efficiency is a byproduct, because competition 
tends to stimulate lowest-cost production and allocate resources more responsively than 
a visible public or private hand.
Id. (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). For a further elaboration of this concept of com­
petition as a process, see note 87 infra.
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the underlying political ends of the regime of law being applied, and the 
unavoidable inductive nature of legal reasoning.55 Analytical positivism 
did not work in the nineteenth century and it will not work now. The 
interesting question is why it is argued that the law should travel down 
this well-trodden and dead-end methodological road once again. Possi­
ble explanations include a desire to impose disguised normative values 
for unstated political reasons,56 protection of the status quo,57 or fear 
that undue judicial discretion would lead to multivalued rules of 
decision.58
The last of these fears is based upon an erroneous assumption, of 
interest to the objectives of this Article, about the nature of legal reason­
ing. It is here that misuse of economic analysis in antitrust litigation 
occurs, due to an apparent belief that nothing short of a single-value, 
mechanical model for legal decision making can make the law “rational.” 
To paraphrase Arthur Leff, what one sees by relying exclusively on the 
neoclassical model is the artificial light of the model, not the reality it is 
intended to illuminate.59
Judge Bork exemplifies the genre. He asserts that “[t]o abandon 
economic theory is to abandon the possibility of a rational antitrust 
law”60 and that only by means of neoclassical price theory can antitrust
55 See, e.g., Green, supra note 25 (discussing legal positivism and formalism in context of 
law of negligence).
56 See generally Flynn, “Reaganomics” and Antitrust Enforcement: A  Jurisprudential Cri­
tique, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 269, 281, 312 (discussing Reagan Administration’s “simplistic liber­
tarianism”); Rowe, supra note 18, at 1559-62 (assessing political and normative goals of 
current antitrust policy).
57 Chicago School reasoning assumes the existence of a legal system, an existing distribu­
tion of wealth entitled to legal protection, and the enforcement of the contract and property 
rights of those with power.
[M]odem economists assume that someone else, presumably the lawyers, has already 
taken care of the problem of “externalities”—whether costs or benefits—by providing 
for their assignment or appropriation by the state’s enforcement of particular private 
property rules. Likewise, someone else has already taken care of the problem of exclud­
ing fraudulent transactions and/or transactions under duress from the universe of per­
fect competitors.
Kennedy, supra note 30, at 961.
58 Extreme legal realism implies that there are no predictable rules to govern behavior, 
guide the decision maker, control discretion, or insure the goals of the lawgiver. See Lehman, 
Rules in Law, 72 Geo. L.J. 1571 (1984). The problem is to find a ground between rigid formal­
ism and extreme realism. The law and economics movement tends in the direction of rigid 
formalism. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 45. The CLS movement tends to the opposite ex­
treme. See Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 
413, 430-33 (1984); Stick, supra note 8; White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 
Stan. L. Rev. 649 (1984); Note, Expanding the Legal Vocabulary: The Challenge Posed by the 
Deconstruction and Defense of Law, 95 Yale L.J. 969 (1986).
59 See Leff, supra note 26, at 482.
60 R. Bork, supra note 3, at 117. There are four rather generous assumptions inherent in 
this statement: (1) that a multiplicity of insights and values implies a total abandonment of
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analysis avoid an irrational resort to vague economic, political, and social 
goals for antitrust policy—what Bork and others call “poetry.”61
Neoclassical price theory places any business practice under any cir­
cumstances into only one of three categories: (1) efficient (within the 
meaning of efficiency as defined by the model); (2) inefficient because it 
restricts output (measured by the concept of consumer welfare as defined 
by the model); or (3) neutral because the practice is unrelated to the only 
things that count—productive or allocative efficiency as measured by the 
model.62 It is further asserted that “price theory enables us to identify, 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy, those activities whose primary 
effect is output restricting, leading to the inference that all other activity 
is either efficiency creating or neutral.”63
Finally, it is claimed that, in all cases where the model indicates that 
activity is neutral or does not provide a basis for predicting effects on 
“consumer welfare,” the law should not intervene.64 This reasoning is 
backed by the unsubstantiated and startling assertion that “[t]here is no 
body of knowledge other than conventional price theory that can serve as 
a guide to the effects of business behavior upon consumer welfare.”65 
Why this is so and how it can be proved are never stated, although those 
who wander about in the epistemological quandaries of other intellectual
economic analysis; (2) that other insights have no claim to truth; (3) that true knowledge can 
only be obtained through some process called “rational”; and (4) that the only rational knowl­
edge is that produced by economic theory and, particularly, by neoclassical price theory. 
These assumptions often show up in bald statements suggesting that arguments relying on 
social or political goals rely on “poetry” and are, therefore, meaningless. See “No-Fault” 
Monopolization Proposal Debated by Presidential Commission on Antitrust Reform, Anti­
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 880, at A-22 (Sept. 14, 1978) (quoting Robert Bork); 
Panel Discussion on Economic Analysis, 12 Sw. U.L. Rev. 355 (1981) (statement of Prof. 
Clower) (referring to economists who criticize the Chicago School, stating “I am unable to see 
a role in the law or elsewhere for an ‘economics’ that starts from a base in poetry or metaphys­
ics”). Poets, no doubt, will disagree that theirs is a meaningless effort incapable of providing 
insights into reality. An examination of the assumptions of neoclassical theory reveals that its 
practitioners are in the same boat as the rest of us—practicing “poetry.”
61 See note 60 supra.
62 R. Bork, supra note 3, at 122. This breakdown of conduct or structure into mutually 
exclusive categories may be called the “either-or” fallacy. Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 
Hastings L.J. 517, 539 n.5 (1987). While such a division may hold true in closed systems of 
analysis like Euclidean geometry, complex facts and human conduct do not fall into such black 
and white categories—except perhaps questions of whether one is pregnant or not, or alive or 
not. Even in the latter instances it is not unknown for questions to arise that test the borders of 
the categories. To believe that all business practices fall into only one of the categories of 
efficient, inefficient, or neutral suggests an analysis of the abstract model rather than of the 
complex and messy reality of the real world.
63 R. Bork, supra note 3, at 116.
64 Id. at 117. It should be noted that the law has already intervened by creating and en­
forcing contract and property rights, and that there is an existing distribution of wealth by the 
legal system. See Baker, supra note 34; Kennedy, supra note 57.
65 R. Bork, supra note 3, at 117.
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pursuits may take some comfort from the claim that economics at least 
has arrived at knowable, eternal, and unchanging truth.
Unfortunately, reality, and the values Congress mandated that anti­
trust policy fulfill, do not comport with the assumptions of the neoclassi­
cal model. The model and its definitions preclude a constructive analysis 
of reality in light of the values underlying the law. The model is crude 
and is similar to the per se rules criticized by law and economics advo­
cates for their failure to consider possible explanations justifying the 
conduct condemned. Further, the neoclassical model rejects other 
sources of wisdom for antitrust, including other schools of economic 
thought66 and subdivisions within the neoclassical school itself, in favor 
of a theory based on assumptions of how a perfectly competitive and 
perfectly monopolized world would look.
B. Some Consequences o f Substituting Positive Economics for Legal 
Reasoning and Congressional Goals
The current success of the law and economics movement may be 
attributable, at least in part, to the inflexible per se rules of the past. 
Antitrust policy has long been preoccupied with certainty in its rules.67 
Courts adopted rigid per se rules and then a vague rule of reason in order 
to identify activity that ought to be condemned.
As with most inflexible legal rules, application of the rules took pre­
cedence over implementation of the law’s objectives and a thorough eval­
uation of the facts unique to the dispute. For example, the issue in 
antitrust disputes often became whether the conduct under examination 
fell squarely within a category of per se illegal conduct,68 without consid­
ering why the category of conduct had been declared per se illegal. The 
concepts of contract, combination, and conspiracy became playgrounds 
for the medieval metaphysician in the attempt to mitigate the rigidity of
66 See generally Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the 
Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 738 (1981) (discussing theories of predatory 
pricing); Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 994 (1979) (discussing use of economic models in antitrust law, including tests 
for predatory pricing).
67 See text accompanying notes 8-17 supra.
68 See, e.g., Fortner Enters, v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 498-500 
(1969) (holding tying arrangements per se illegal if certain prerequisites met); Albrecht v. Her­
ald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (holding retail price fixing by agreements per se illegal); 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (finding per se violation 
when product is sold to distributor subject to territorial restrictions on resale), overruled by 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See generally Ponsoldt, The 
Application of Sherman Act Anti-Boycott Law to Industry Self-Regulation: An Analysis Inte­
grating Nonboycott Sherman Act Principles, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1981) (arguing that courts 
should apply per se rules in evaluating industry self-regulation efforts undertaken without gov­
ernment approval).
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per se rules. Distinctions not recognized elsewhere in the law were 
drawn between unilateral and bilateral conduct by litigants. Courts lost 
sight of the underlying reason for determining whether joint conduct vio­
lated the congressional goals underlying the prohibition upon “restraints 
of trade.”69
With its pseudoscientific aura of producing the right answer, the law 
and economics approach may have appeared irresistible to the uniniti­
ated. The model can be overwhelming to committed legal positivists, 
even though we have all been wisely warned that “our quest for certitude 
is so ardent that we pay an irrational reverence to a technique which uses 
symbols of certainty, even though experience again and again warns us 
they are delusive.”70
69 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984). 
The essence of a § 1 violation is whether there is joint action resulting in a restraint of trade. 
See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939); United States v. General 
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1926); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 
(1919). The conduct that was alleged in the cited cases satisfies the legal requirements for a 
contract or conspiracy as those terms are used elsewhere in the law. The issue should be 
whether it is the type of contract or conspiracy that violates the values to be preserved and 
protected by outlawing “restraints of trade.” Instead of analyzing the possible existence of a 
contract or conspiracy without considering the goals of the antitrust law, courts decide 
whether a contract or conspiracy ought to be treated as a contract or conspiracy. Coercive 
“unilateral refusals to deal” thereby escaped condemnation of the statute because there was no 
contract or conspiracy, see Colgate, 250 U.S. at 305, even though they resulted in compliance 
with the supplier’s price fixing demands, interfered with the independence of traders, led to 
higher prices to consumers, and displaced the competitive process with power. Judicial in­
quiry should have proceeded further to determine whether the refusal to deal under the cir­
cumstances ought to be found an unlawful restraint of trade. See Andersen, The Antitrust 
Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices—The Case for Presumptive Illegality,
54 Wash. L. Rev. 763 (1979) (arguing that Colgate doctrine should be abandoned and identical 
standards should be used to evaluate vertical and horizontal price communications).
The different and subtle issue of sufficiency of the evidence so that a jury might determine 
the existence of joint action would still remain. However, it would be directed to the question 
of whether the facts were legally sufficient under the general definitions of contract or conspir­
acy to be deemed an illegal restraint of trade. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 765-66 (1984) (finding sufficient evidence for jury to determine that conspiracy or 
agreement existed).
70 Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 643 n.40 (1944) (Jack­
son, J., dissenting). Distinguished and creative economists have issued similar warnings. For 
example, Joseph Schumpeter warned:
Analytic work begins with material provided by our vision of things, and this vision is 
ideological almost by definition.. . .  The more honest and naive our vision is, the more 
dangerous is it to the eventual emergence of anything for which general validity can be 
claimed.
J. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 42-43 (1954). Frank H. Knight observed:
[A] fetish of “scientific method” in the study of society is one of the two most pernicious 
forms of romantic folly that are current among the educated.. . .  [A] natural or positive 
science of human conduct. . .  is not what we need; indeed, the idea is an absurdity.
F. Knight, The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics, in On the History and Method of 
Economics 250, 260-61 (1956).
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With respect to vertical restraints, traditional per se analysis and 
neoclassical analysis are strikingly similar: both deductively apply defini­
tions premised on hidden value choices to predetermined facts. For ex­
ample, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,11 a majority of the 
Court held that the common law rule against restraints on alienation dic­
tated a per se rule against vertically imposed customer and territorial 
restraints.72' Any attempt to interfere with the use or disposition of prop­
erty once title had passed was apparently illegal without room for justifi­
cations.73 This analysis considered only distributor freedom and 
disregarded the effect of distribution practices on the public or the sup­
plier. By the same token, the only fact that mattered was the legal fact of 
whether title to the goods had been transferred.
The opposite position, advocated by neoclassical theorists and used 
by the Supreme Court in Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTESylvania Inc.74 to 
overrule Arnold, Schwinn & Co., applied an undefined rule of reason to 
vertical customer and territorial restraints, effectively making them per 
se lawful.75 This reversal was done in the name of bringing “market con­
siderations” to bear in evaluating vertical restraints. Under this analysis, 
the sole objective is to maximize the wealth of the proponent of the re­
straint, without regard to the circumstances in which the restraint is im­
posed, the public interest, or the rights and interests of the victim. The 
restraint is assumed to benefit the public because the assumptions of the 
model so dictate.76 The effect of the restraint on others in the system of
71 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36 (1977).
72 Id. at 379-80.
73 Putting aside claimed economic justifications for vertical restraints, see, e.g., Goldberg, 
The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 736 (1984) (arguing for presumption that manufacturer knows best when determin­
ing value of restrictions as long as no interbrand cartels exist), practical circumstances, such as 
the need to control distribution and use of dangerous products or to guarantee the quality of 
perishable products, arguably ought to justify the limited use of such restraints, see, e.g., Trip­
oli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 937-38 (3d Cir.) (finding restraints reasonable and in 
public interest to prevent public from harm), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Adolph Coors 
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974) (allowing brewer to 
condition sales to distributors on requirement that distributors safeguard product quality but 
not to restrict territories or persons to whom product can be distributed once brewer parts 
with title), cert, denied, 419 U.S 1105 (1975). However, deference to the assumed “rational­
ity” of one side of the bargain does not account for the reality of modem marketing in the 
context of most antitrust litigation. Form distribution, franchise contracts, and coercive 
threats of termination have replaced the eighteenth-century model of fanners freely bargaining 
over their produce and wares on market day.
74 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967)).
75 See id. at 57-59.
76 See R. Bork, supra note 3, at 291-98 (discussing objections to thesis that all manufac­
turer-imposed vertical restraints should be deemed lawful); Posner, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing
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distribution is ignored; the model either assumes that effect to be the 
product of free bargaining in a perfectly competitive market, or assumes 
that the actual impact of the restraint on a distributor and consumers is 
irrelevant to the analysis.
The market considerations that enforcement agencies and many 
courts have brought to bear since Continental T. V have involved nothing 
more than the mechanical application of neoclassical theory. At its best, 
this approach singles out the value of maximizing the economic freedom 
of persons and private collectives proposing vertical restraints in the mar­
keting process; at its worst, the theory protects without question the 
property and contract rights of those who have the power to impose the 
restraint. The “free rider”77 argument assumes the rationality of the pro­
ponent of the restraint78 in a perfectly competitive market.79 By the
that vertical restrictions on distributors should be per se legal). The argument is that distribu­
tors will impose vertical restraints only to achieve efficiency and increase output. Because it is 
efficient to impose restraints, consumer welfare will be enhanced and output increased even 
though the restraint may increase prices. This hypothesis has been persuasively challenged. 
See Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev 1153 (1987) 
(describing conditions, qualifications, and inconsistencies in efficiency analysis of antitrust re­
straints); Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust 
Policy, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1985) [hereinafter Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing] (analyzing 
vertical restraints and taking view, contrary to Bork’s, that these restraints might harm con­
sumers); Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rival’s Costs to Achieve 
Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986) (finding current policy toward exclusionary behav­
ior not clear and suggesting alternative analysis); Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Re­
straints, 52 Antitrust L.J. 687 (1983) (analyzing arguments of Bork and Posner, suggesting 
rule-of-reason analysis for vertical restraints cases).
77 The “free rider” problem has been explained as follows:
Sales are directed from the retailers who do provide the special services [jointly with the 
product] at the higher price to the retailers who do not provide the special services and 
offer to sell the product at the lower price . . . .  A customer, because of the special 
services provided by the retailer, is persuaded to buy the product. But he purchases the 
product from another paying a lower price. In this way the retailers who do not provide 
the special services get a free ride at the expense of those who have convinced consumers 
to buy the product.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960).
78 For analysis suggesting that reliance on the concept of the free rider produces inefficient 
results, see Barrett, Restrictive Distribution and the Assault of the “Free Riders,” 7 J. Corp. L. 
467 (1982). The concept of the free rider is a rationalization for unlimited legal protection of 
the property and contract rights of the proponent of a restraint. Although recognition of the 
free rider purports to foster an efficient allocation of resources under the constraints of a per­
fectly competitive market, it actually deflects analysis from the circumstances in which the 
restraint is imposed, as well as from an evaluation of the contract and property rights of both 
the victim of the restraint and of the public. See Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, supra note 
76, at 999-1000; Scherer, supra note 76, at 694. As such, the free rider is another example of a 
cliche capturing and distorting analysis.
79 See generally Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule 
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1495 (1983) (advocating per se rule against 
vertical price fixing as most efficient way to address free-rider problem, with limited exceptions 
to per se rule to preserve efficient enforcement).
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same token, the argument makes the assumed rationality of the propo­
nent of the restraint the only fact worthy of consideration. “Rationality” 
is used circularly, however, in that whatever the proponent desires is 
deemed rational if it is theoretically wealth enhancing, without regard to 
the rationality of other distributors or consumers.
The failure of current executive and judicial treatment of vertical 
restraints is evidenced by the fact that, instead of an antitrust policy 
moderating pressures for governmental interference in market processes, 
there is a vacuum of control. This vacuum is generating growing pres­
sure at the federal and state level for inteijection of complex and often 
anticompetitive franchising and other laws to regulate vertical market 
relationships.80 Thus, if the goals underlying the antitrust laws are ig­
nored or repudiated by the executive and judicial branches, the demo­
cratic process will seek to achieve those goals more intensively 
elsewhere.
111
A  M u l t i -V a l u e d  M e t h o d  f o r  A n a l y z i n g  V e r t ic a l  
R e s t r a in t  A g r e e m e n t s
In order to implement a more democratically responsive yet predict­
able use of antitrust policy to regulate vertical restraint agreements con­
sistently with the requirements of legal reasoning, courts must employ a 
pragmatic and inductive method of analysis.81 In addition, courts must 
provide an analytical framework within which conduct can sensibly be 
evaluated by lawyers advising their clients and by courts adjudicating 
antitrust claims. Without such guidelines, rejection of the undue and
80 Special federal and state franchising laws are multiplying; many of these laws are not in 
the public interest. The statutes are surveyed in L. Schwartz, J. Flynn & H. First, Free Enter­
prise and Economic Organization: Antitrust 760-97 (6th ed. 1983). For an extensive empirical 
analysis of a pending proposal to legitimize restrictive vertical practices in the beer industry by 
special statute, which concludes that the empirical basis for the supposed efficiency of vertical 
restraints is much weaker than claimed by their supporters, see Carstensen & Dahlson, Verti­
cal Restraints in Beer Distribution: A Study of the Business Justifications for and Legal Analy­
sis of Restricting Competition, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 1.
81 See Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing 
the Chaos, 49 Antitrust L.J. 1593, 1610-11 (1980). One method of analysis might be described 
as follows:
The spectrum from per se to rule of reason analysis is a single methodology presenting 
varying levels of evidentiary presumptions ordering the analysis of whether there has 
been an unreasonable displacement of the competitive process.
Conceptualizing per se doctrine as a separate category of rules and rule of reason 
analysis as necessarily requiring a significant quantitative effect on competition has en­
gendered confusion in the cases.
Id.; see also Beschle, “What Never? Well Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alter­
native to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L.J. 471 (1987); Ponsoldt, supra note 17.
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misleading certainty offered by the neoclassical model will likely create 
undue uncertainty.
A central requirement of a counter methodology, one not met by 
exclusive use of the neoclassical model, is that it be compatible with the 
nature and requirements of legal reasoning. Legal reasoning is not a sys­
tem in which rules X  facts =  decision. Long ago, Dean Leon Green 
attacked such reasoning and the formalism that plagued the law of 
torts.82 Dean Green observed that tort cases were being decided on the 
basis of meaningless notions of proximate cause (similar to standing anal­
ysis in antitrust) and shallow mechanical definitions (like the per se rules 
and neoclassical definitions used to determine the rules of antitrust) that 
divided conduct into particular named torts, each with its own “ele­
ments” or subdefinitions to be satisfied.83 A similar battle must be fought 
against reliance on the formalism of neoclassical theory in the legal anal­
ysis of antitrust disputes.
Dean Green proposed that tort litigation could be broken into the 
following analytical format:
(1) Is there a factual connection between the plaintiff’s injury and 
the defendant?
(2) Do the policies of the law and its system of protection extend to 
the interest that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate; and if some protection is 
afforded, what standard of care does the legal system impose upon the 
defendant?
(3) Was the standard of care breached by the defendant?
(4) What are the damages?84
The key elements of Dean Green’s analytical method as applied to 
antitrust litigation are his second and third factors: Do the policies of the 
antitrust laws and their system of protection extend to the interest that 
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate, and, if some protection is afforded, what 
standard of care does the legal system impose on the defendant? This is 
the central policy question with which the courts must grapple in estab­
lishing the rules that ought to govern the litigation of vertical market 
restraints as well as other rules developed under the antitrust laws. Res­
olution of these questions requires constant recourse to the multivalued 
goals Congress intended antitrust enforcement to fulfill. Courts must 
then evaluate the facts of a given dispute in light of those values.
The congressional goals of antitrust policy are designed to guarantee 
to suppliers, distributors, consumers, and the public that a competitive
82 Many of Dean Green’s writings are collected in L. Green, The Litigation Process in Tort 
Law (2d ed. 1977).
83 See Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1955).
84 See id. at 24.
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process will govern the distribution of goods.85 To the extent that private 
contract and property rights are used to displace that process, the anti­
trust laws act to constrain the exercise of those rights.
Antitrust policy should therefore be viewed as part of the definition 
of the scope of property and contract rights, not as a rationalization for 
undermining the law’s obligation to enforce those rights or to ignore the 
property and contract rights of others. Vertical customer, territory, and 
price restraints, on their face, limit the freedom of suppliers, distributors, 
and the public to choose from whom they may buy or sell. Vertical re­
straint agreements, by definition, reduce the commercial rivalry that is at 
the heart of the competitive process.
If, however, one begins with the neoclassical assumption that the 
contract and property rights of the proponent of a restraint are absolute, 
and that the market in which the restraint occurs is perfectly competi­
tive, it is not difficult to see why the reality of the dispute is ignored and 
the values underlying antitrust policy are disregarded. The “rational,” 
and therefore “efficient,” and therefore “lawful,” combination will al­
ways be that which has been privately bargained for, or coerced.
When vertical restraints on price, customers, and territories are im­
posed, the circumstances are not ordinarily those of a perfectly competi­
tive market. In a perfectly competitive market, such a literal limitation 
on competition could not long be maintained. Rather, one or the other 
side of a transaction often attempts to displace competition in order to 
realize prices above a competitive level and to transfer wealth from the 
victim of the restraint and consumers to the perpetrator. It is at this 
point that the neoclassical model is fundamentally at odds with the intent 
of Congress. The neoclassical model assumes that such a wealth transfer 
enhances efficiency and therefore is beneficial. Congress has legislated, 
however, that wealth transfers resulting from displacement of competi­
tion are illegal.86
Consequently, the duties imposed on parties to a private transaction, 
and the rights of the public as beneficiary of a competitive process, 
should warrant a rebuttable presumption that vertical restraints violate 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. It is no answer to substitute the neoclassi­
cal model and its assumptions of rationality, efficiency, and perfect com­
petition for implementation of the congressional goals for antitrust policy 
in the context of the reality of the dispute before the court. Belief that 
the “rationality” of the proponent of a restraint is a proxy for the rights 
of the victim of the restraint, the public, and the goals of antitrust policy 
mandated by Congress necessarily denies those rights, ignores the reality
85 See Fox, supra note 52, at 1182.
86 See Lande, supra note 49.
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of the dispute, and frustrates the congressional goals for antitrust policy.
There may be circumstances, however, in which the facts are not 
conclusive as to where the public interest, as defined by the multivalued 
goals of antitrust policy, resides. The courts therefore should view the 
distinction between the per se and rule of reason analyses as an eviden­
tiary one establishing levels of presumptions of illegality and legality, and 
not as a distinction between hard and fast categories of lawful and unlaw­
ful conduct. Treating per se rules as evidentiary presumptions of varying 
levels of rebuttability would permit inductive reasoning to bridge the gap 
between the facts of individual cases and the policies underlying the anti­
trust laws.
This approach will provide the flexibility necessary for a sensible 
evaluation of fact and policy. Under this analysis, per se rules are treated 
as evidentiary presumptions of illegality, with rebuttability depending on 
the degree to which private agreements displace the competitive process 
in the reality of a particular dispute.87
For example, successfully maintained vertical price fixing is often 
the expression of economic power based on market imperfections, imbal­
ances in bargaining power, or the presence of some level of oligopoly-like 
power due to trademarks or product differentiation. As such, vertical 
price fixing directly interferes with the freedom and opportunity of retail 
competitors to compete on the merits and usually results in higher prices 
to consumers. It enables the proponent of a restraint to assert an abso­
lute property right and to suppress distributor competition on price, de­
nying the right of independent distributors to succeed or fail on the 
competitive merits. Consequently, a relatively conclusive presumption of 
illegality is justified in cases of vertical price fixing.
Courts should work out over time the types of evidence that will 
overcome the presumption of illegality and determine when factual issues 
should be submitted to the jury. For example, the need to inform con­
sumers through national advertising may justify advertising suggested re­
tail prices, although coercion in enforcing the suggested price should 
remain presumptively unlawful. Thus, the scope of efficiency and other 
defenses can be defined in the context of the goals of antitrust policy and 
the realities of individual cases rather than be assumed in light of the 
abstract definitions and unreal normative and factual assumptions of the
87 T he com petitive process, no t “com petition,”  is th e  key concept in the  analysis. Use of 
“com petition” as the  tool for analysis and as the  definition o f  the  scope o f the  duties imposed 
by th e  an titru st laws has confined the  analysis to  neoclassical theory’s m odels o f perfect com­
petition and  pure m onopoly. T his substitutes abstract definitions o f “com petition” for the 
values Congress m andated  for an titru st policy, and substitutes facts assum ed by the m odel for 
the  reality o f  individual cases.
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In some circumstances—for example, vertical maximum price fix­
ing—a more extended inquiry may be justified. However, this inquiry 
should still be conducted with a presumption of illegality because the 
impact of the restraint severely curtails the rights of distributors to suc­
ceed or fail through a competitive process. In cases where maximum 
price fixing takes place, be it horizontal89 or vertical,90 the markets in­
volved are usually characterized by a virtually complete departure from 
the ideal of a perfectly competitive market.91
Assumption of power by a monopolistic supplier, or by a horizontal 
agreement among distributors to fix a maximum price, is a direct dis­
placement of the competitive process of price determination. It is an as­
sumption of power by the proponent of the restraint, denying rights of 
distributors and consumers to make their own judgments about pricing— 
a denial of rights guaranteed by the goals of antitrust policy. Congress 
did not leave to the proponents of such restraints the authority to deter­
mine unilaterally the scope of the contract rights of distributors. Simi­
larly, Congress did not intend the proponents of maximum price fixing to 
determine what the best price should be for the benefit of the public.
Neoclassical theorists, preoccupied with giving the effect of an abso­
lute right of freedom of contract to the proponent of vertical restraints, 
have been particularly harsh in their treatment of the per se prohibition 
on maximum price fixing.92 Their critiques illustrate an analytical pro­
cess based on unrealistic assumptions of fact used to dictate a policy 
designed to maximize an extreme view of private contract and property
November 1987] LEGAL REASONING 1149
88 See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
89 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
90 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
91 As in Albrecht, for example, monopoly newspapers often use independent newspaper 
distributors to avoid the risks and burdens of retail distribution. See id. at 154-55 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). Distributors are usually treated as independent contractors fully responsible for 
tort and other liabilities incurred at their level of distribution, usually have little or no bargain­
ing power, and are exempt from some labor regulations designed to curb an imbalance of 
bargaining power in certain labor relations. Giving monopoly newspapers the right to impose 
whatever contractual terms they wish on their “independent contractors” without incurring 
any of the risks of the distribution of the product reflects an extreme view of the rights and 
rationalities of the monopolist without any concern for the reality in which the legal right to 
contract is being implemented. This achieves the best of both worlds for the monopolist: total 
freedom of contract and the right to have the state enforce the contract imposed without the 
reality of the circumstances intruding into the analysis.
92 See R. Bork, supra note 3, at 439; Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 886 (1981); Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Re­
strictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1019, 1034-49 (1986). As else­
where, the neoclassical analysis here assumes perfectly competitive markets and maximization 
of output as the sole objective of the proponent of the restraint. It further assumes that en­
hancement of consumer welfare in terms of lower prices will be the necessary effect of permit­
ting the imposition of maximum prices.
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rights.
Because many disputes arising under the antitrust laws do not occur 
in perfectly competitive markets, and given the congressionally man­
dated goals of antitrust policy, there should be a presumption of illegality 
with regard to maximum price fixing, horizontal or vertical. Each case 
should be examined to determine whether the facts sufficiently rebut the 
presumption. Because courts are not normally thought competent to en­
gage in rate regulation, the presumption of illegality should usually carry 
the day. The parties to such unusual arrangements should be forced to 
negotiate a less restrictive alternative consistent with the values of anti­
trust policy.93
A similar presumption of illegality is justified for vertically imposed 
divisions of territories and customers, particularly because the less re­
strictive alternative of unilaterally selecting and terminating dealers is 
available. Sheltering a product from interdealer price competition by 
customer or territorial divisions should be permitted only when there is a 
justifiable public interest in doing so, such as protecting the public in the 
distribution of dangerous products.94
The rule of reason should be viewed as a tool of analysis in those 
situations in which no presumption of illegality would apply. This might 
occur, for example, when there is no initial showing of anticompetitive 
purpose or effect. Courts should view a rule of reason case as an inquiry 
into whether there has been an unreasonable displacement of the compet­
itive process in light of all the circumstances of the case. That inquiry, in 
turn, should be primarily a factual one similar to the long-established 
standards for a rule of reason inquiry set forth by Chicago Board o f 
Trade v. United States.95 This inquiry does not require definition of a 
relevant market and power in that market.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
93 Adjusting unusual factual circumstances to the values of antitrust policy through the use 
of evidentiary presumptions subject to justifications or excuse is not unique. Courts have been 
doing this in a number of cases without expressly admitting it. See, e.g., Federal Trade 
Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding no economic analysis nec­
essary when horizontal agreement limited consumer choice and participants in horizontal 
agreements offered no competitive justification).
94 See note 73 supra.
95 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.96 
Finally, in a further effort to rectify the current analytical difficulties 
with antitrust enforcement, Congress should consider spelling out more 
explicitly the goals of antitrust policy. Legislation should be adopted 
amending the Sherman Act by inserting as a preamble to the statute the 
goals of antitrust policy as summarized by Professor Fox.97 Such an 
amendment might read:
Preamble: Congress hereby finds and declares that the goals of anti­
trust policy are: 1. The dispersion of economic power; 2. Freedom and 
opportunity to compete on the merits; 3. Satisfaction of consumers; 
and 4. Protection of the competitive process as market governor.98 
Together, these suggested changes in analysis of antitrust disputes 
may return the inquiry to the objectives from which it has strayed and to 
a sensible application of the law to the rich variety of facts tossed up by 
the legal process.
C o n c l u s io n
Antitrust enforcement is trapped at a sterile intellectual crossroads 
by an analytical positivism that prevents it from addressing reality in 
light of the values Congress has mandated it to fulfill. Antitrust policy 
has been similarly trapped in the past. Part of the reason for the present 
problem is a reaction to past practice, which reflexively condemned any 
restraint fitting a predetermined definition as per se illegal. The problem 
is also attributable to fear of according discretion to the decision maker 
and to the undeserved certainty accorded to a model promising the right 
answer without regard to the facts of individual cases, the policies of the 
law, or the requirements of legal reasoning. Today, instead of economic 
analysis assisting antitrust analysis by illuminating some aspects of real­
ity, a narrow brand of economic analysis is used to the exclusion of 
broader economic and other insights, the facts of individual cases, and 
the institutional responsibilities and logical method of the legal process.
In implementing the goals of antitrust through a method of legal 
reasoning that weighs these goals in light of the realities of the case, 
courts should change their approach to the per se rules and the rule of
96 Id. at 238.
97 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
98 The co-author of this article has advocated in testimony before the U.S. House Judiciary 
Committee that such a preamble to the Sherman Act be included in pending legislation, H.R. 
585, designed to codify the per se rule for vertical price fixing. See Testimony of James F. 
Ponsoldt before the House Comm, on the Judiciary, Feb. 26, 1987 (on file at New York Uni­
versity Law Review); cf. Spivak, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of 
Monopoly Power: A Response, 52 Antitrust L.J. 651, 653 (1983) (proposing more lengthy list 
of Congress’s intended goals that might be made preamble to Sherman Act).
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reason. Per se rules should be considered evidentiary presumptions, of 
varying levels of rebuttability, for determing whether there has been an 
unreasonable displacement of the competitive process. The rule of rea­
son should be used only where no presumption of illegality would apply.
Antitrust enforcement, like any other form of law enforcement, can­
not avoid discretion. Courts must determine what rules and facts are 
relevant, what they mean, and how these rules and facts ought to interact 
to produce an informed and reasoned judgment on the legality of the 
conduct under consideration. The concepts it uses are tools, not rules, 
for bridging the gap between facts from the real world and values under­
lying the regime of law involved in the dispute. Antitrust policy cannot 
avoid confronting the intellectual reality that every legal decision is un­
avoidably a moral one. Like any other form of legal analysis, antitrust 
policy’s primary tool is legal reasoning—a method of reasoning that is 
inductive and deductive, one that is constantly required to reexamine the 
values underlying the law within the constraints upon the judicial pro­
cess. To some this may be “poetry”; to an experienced legal system it is 
the essence of legal reasoning and the rule of law.
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